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Abstract: The importance of financial liberalization is well documented in the literature. However, there has 
been an emergency of studies, which indicate that this can be another channel through which financial 
instability is generated in the domestic economy. Utilising data from four SADC countries, the empirical 
findings show that financial reforms are positively related to financial instability in almost all the 
specifications. The empirical results further revealed that financial instability intensifies in the face of a 
financial crisis. The result suggests that financial liberalization can therefore be another source of financial 
instability in the region. The empirical results imply that though policymakers should liberalise the financial 
system, policies aimed at maintaining financial stability should also be promoted.   
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1. Background of the Study 
 
The past decade witnessed, several developing countries liberalizing their financial systems with the aim of 
increasing the scope of the financial sector, and enhancing its role of mobilising and allocating financial 
resources to productive sectors of the economy (Enowbi and Mlambo, 2012). According to Patnaik (2011) 
financial liberalization was introduced in developing countries in the 1980s with the aim of giving financial 
markets a greater role in the development of countries and not just relies on the state. Patnaik (2011) further 
noted that bringing in financial liberalization was also a response to a number of issues relating to finance in 
developing countries. These issues included inefficiencies in the financial system, which was stifling the 
financial sector. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) defined financial liberalization as “establishing higher 
interest rates that balance the demand for and the supply of savings”. When a country has higher interest 
rates, this would eventually lead to increased savings and financial intermediation as well as enhance the 
efficiency of using savings in the economy. This will eventually translate into improved economic growth. 
However, Magud, Reinhart and Vesperoni (2012) indicate that even though financial liberalization succeeded 
in easing financial repression, its impact on growth and investment has not been convincing.  
 
At the same time, there are studies such as Demirguc- Kunt and Levine (2008) and Enowbi and Mlambo 
(2012) which highlight that financial sector liberalization may create financial sector instability and crisis. 
The financial crisis could manifest itself in the form of bank failures, intense asset price volatility or a collapse 
in market liquidity. This has the potential of disrupting the payment and settlement process with dire effects 
as it can be transmitted to the real sector through its linkages with the financial sector. This is also supported 
by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and Lorenzo (2008). Ikhide and Alawode (2002) also document a 
number of problems, which many of the African countries went through after liberalizing their financial 
systems. These challenges include sharp increases in interest rates, bankruptcies of financial institutions and 
high levels of inflation. Liberalization also resulted in increased capital inflows, which allowed rapid growth 
in credit to public and private institutions, which were regarded as weak at the time. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2008) also highlight how the quality of lending in general deteriorated in many of the countries, 
which implemented liberalization.  
 
The SADC 2012 report on financial sector development points out that through the development of the 
protocol on trade, the region is implementing plans, which are aimed at increasing economic liberalization 
within the Southern Africa Development Community. The protocol is in line with the SADC vision of a regional 
integration, which is supported by member states as it is viewed as another way through which the region 
may have a strong economy as well as increasing international investment. Although much has been put 
forward to support financial sector liberalization, it becomes important to also examine if it can be another 
source of financial sector instability in the region given the mixed results in the academic discourse. The 
paper is organised as follows: following the introduction, section two discuss the available literature, section 
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three presents the model utilised in the study with section four and five presenting the discussion of results 
and conclusions. The study is based on the De Meza and Webb (1987) model, which explains how financial 
liberalization may result in financial instability. According to the model, financial instability is defined as a 
decrease in the ability to repay bank loans.  
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
Financial liberalization is assumed to result in an increase in capital flows which is usually followed by a 
credit boom. When there is a credit boom, the probability of over-borrowing is high. This is supported by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) who argued that the probability of crashes in emerging markets is large in 
the event that the capital account is open. The model assumes that entrepreneurs borrow money from banks 
to start up projects. Due to financial liberalization there will be an increase in loanable funds due to an 
increase in capital flows. This will therefore intensify bank competition as the banks scramble for customers, 
which may result in a decline in franchise value of banks. In a bid to cope up with the competition, banks may 
respond by accepting risk exposures which are beyond the usual standards so as to increase profits. Bezemer, 
et al. (2015) highlights that some of the strategies which banks can engage in include economising on 
screening and monitoring efforts. Banks may also gamble on their loan allocation decisions. This is in line 
with Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006) who argue that in a liberalised financial system, banks may relax their 
screening efforts, which may increase the risk of the funded projects failing.  Lorenzeni (2008) also suggests 
that competitive financial contracts may result in excessive borrowing ex-ante and excessive volatility ex-
post. There are a number of empirical studies, which have been carried out to examine the relationship 
between financial liberalization and financial instability though conclusions are varied.  
 
Of the available studies, Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006), argues that the liberalisation of the financial sector 
results in an increase in credit availability as banks relax their screen efforts. This will result in risk projects 
being funded, which increase the probability of failure and default. In another study, Bezemer et al. (2015) 
established that entry of risky entrepreneurs due to a decrease in borrowing costs can be another channel 
through which financial liberalization may result in financial instability. Utilizing impaired loans as a measure 
of financial liberalization the authors established that countries, which are more liberalized, experienced 
more financial instability during the 2008 global financial crisis. There are studies, which have established 
that financial liberalization results in a credit boom. Of these studies, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) 
established that financial liberalization results in an increased inflow of capital, which is then followed by a 
domestic credit boom. This is consistent with the IMF World Economic Outlook 2011 survey report, which 
shows that in 19 advanced, and 28 emerging economies financial sector liberalisation resulted in an increase 
in the inflow of external financial resources, which contributed to a credit boom. In addition, Magud et al. 
(2012) also established that in 25 emerging economies, huge capital inflow following financial sector 
liberalisation raised domestic credit.  
 
These findings are consistent with Calderón and Kubota (2012) and Furceri, Guichard, and Rusticelli (2012). 
There are a series of studies also which have established that financial liberalisation may expose countries to 
crises. Of these studies Rancière, Tornell and Westerman (2006) established that countries which have 
financial systems which are liberalised, they have a high probability of experiencing a financial crisis. This will 
also result in a contraction in output. Studies by Bordo, Barry, Daniela, Maria, Martinez, and Andrew (2001), 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), Barrel, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010), and Rodrik (2005), amongst many, 
also show a strong association between financial liberalization and the beginning of a financial crisis. Tornell, 
Westermann and Martinez (2003) also highlight that financial liberalization does come with benefits. The 
authors indicate that in countries with developed financial markets, financial liberalization has contributed 
towards growth, but as well as to higher chances of instability. Tornell et al. (2003) also suggest that 
liberalization results in faster growth as it results in lessened financial constraints, but this happens when 
agents take on credit risk, which in turn makes the economy fragile and exposed to a crisis. Financial 
instability is measured by impaired loan Ratio (ILR) which is a share of loans due by 90 days in gross loans. 
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3. Data and Research Methodology 
 
Model Specification: The study is based on the De Meza and Webb (1987) model discussed earlier which 
proposes that there is a link between financial liberalization and financial instability. In the model, it is 
assumed that entrepreneurs borrow money from banks to start projects. As a country liberalise its financial 
sector, there will be more credit available, which increases the degree of over-borrowing. In addition, due to 
excessive credit availability, this may attract risk entrepreneurs who are likely to default. Thus, as many 
entrepreneurs’ default, this amounts to financial sector instability. Based on the model and Bezemer et al. 
(2015), the following equation is proposed:   
),Re,Re( XformdTxFinformFinfILRit         1 
 
Where ILR is the impaired loans ratio, FinLibit-p is financial liberalization dT represents a dummy variable 
measuring the financial crisis. The study took into account the 2008 global financial crisis (dTglobal) which 
assumes values of 1 and 0 after and before the respective crisis. X represents a number of control variables 
such as Private Credit, GDP, Government consumption and Inflation. T represents time and i represent the 
country. Equation 1 was adopted taking into account other important variables in the SADC countries. Thus 
the following empirical model was utilised:  
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The extent to which financial liberalization may influence the domestic banking sector is not instantaneous 
(Bezemer, et al. 2015). To account for this, Equation 2 was estimated including a lag of the dependent 
variable. 
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Definition of Variables and Expectation Apriori: Financial instability is measured by an impaired loan 
which is a ratio of loans which are 90 days overdue to gross loans. This is consistent with Bezemer, et al. 
(2015). Financial liberalization is measured by financial reform Index of Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel 
(2010). The index is based on seven dimensions ranging between 0 and 21. The literature review section 
indicated how financial liberalization might act as a catalyst for financial instability after a shock. Thus the 
2008 financial crisis will be treated as an external shock. In this case, the 2008 Global financial crisis 
interacted with the financial liberalization variable. For control variables, financial development is measured 
by Private credit as a percentage of gross domestic products (GDP). A negative relationship between financial 
instability and financial sector development is expected. Credit to the private sector is expected to have a 
negative relationship with financial instability. GDP per capita is used to measure economic growth. Inflation 
is measured by the GDP deflator. Government consumption represents the role of the government in the 
domestic economy.  
 
Data Sources: Data were collected for four countries, thus South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Madagascar. The choice for the countries to be included in the study was based on the availability of data. 
Data on financial liberalisation is up to 2012. This has resulted in the study period being confined to the 
period mentioned above. The data for impaired loan ratio was obtained from the DFID project database. The 
remaining variables namely private credit, per capita GDP, inflation and government consumption were 
obtained from the World Development Bank indicators in annual form. 
 
Estimation Technique: The study utilised panel data given the nature of the variables utilised in the study. 
Panel data analysis is a combination of time series and cross-sectional data. Generally, the two approaches to 
panel data analysis are the random effects model and the fixed effects model. The Random effects model 
treats the constants for each section as a random parameter. The advantages of the of the random effects 
model are that the model has fewer parameters as compared to the fixed effects model. It also allows the use 
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of dummies. However, there are a number of challenges with the model. Firstly, there is needed to make 
assumptions pertaining to the distribution of the random component. Secondly, in the event that the 
unobserved group-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, the estimates will be biased 
and inconsistent. On the other hand, concerning the fixed effects model, the constant is treated as group-
specific. The model allows for the different constants for each group. The model is also known as the least 
square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator. In this regard, the model includes a dummy variable for each 
group. The model can be written as follows: 
itkitkititiit uXXXaY   ...........2211  
This can be written as: 
uXDY    
The dummy variable allows one to take different group-specific estimates for each of the constants for each 
different section.  
 
The Hausman Test: The Hausman Specification Test was utilised to choose between the fixed effects and the 
random effects model. The test assumes that there are two estimators, 0 and 1 of the parameter vector  . 
The test thus tests the two parameters whether the random effects are consistent and efficient under the null 
hypothesis, against the alternative that the fixed effects are consistent.   
 
Diagnostic Test: The study also used the residual cross-section dependence test as a diagnostic test. 
According to Pesaran (2004) this test is a simple test of error cross-section dependence which can apply to 
many panel data models with a Large N, but small T. Cross-sectional dependency in the panel, data can be 
tested by three tests. These are the Pesaran CD, Bruesch-Pegan and the corrected LM tests.  
 
4. Presentation of Empirical Results  
 
Correlation Matrix: Table 1 reports the relationship between impaired loans, financial reforms and the 
control variables namely inflation, domestic credit in the private sector, government expenditure and GDP. As 
shown in Table 1, the correlation between impaired loans, credit to the private sector and government 
expenditure is positive and also significant.  
 
Table 1: Correlation Matrix 
 
*** 0.01 p < level; ** p < 0.05 level; * p < 0.1 level 
Source: Author (Computed with E views 8) 
 
Choosing the Correct Model: The Hausman test was estimated so as to choose the appropriate model and 
the results are presented in table 2.  
 
 
 FINANCIAL_REF
ORMS  
LIMPAIRE
D_LOANS  
LDCP  LGOVERNME
NT_EXP  
LINFLATI
ON  
GDP_GROW
TH  
FINANCIAL_REFORMS  1      
LIMPAIRED_LOANS   0.203* 
 
1     
P-value (0.309) -----     
LDCP   0.750*   0.055** 1    
P-value (0.000) (0.781) -----    
LGOVERNMENT_EXP   0.365*  0.023** 0.527* 1   
P-value  (0.061) (0.234) (0.004) -----   
LINFLATION   -0.018**   0.046** -0.121* -0.162* 1  
P-value (0.929) (0.817) (0.544) (0.418) -----  
GDP_GROWTH  -0.241*   0.006** -0.231*  0.280* -0.246* 1 
P-value (0.224) (0.972) (0.246) (0.155) (0.215) ----- 
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Table 2: Hausman Test and F-Test 
Test Test Statistic Critical value Conclusion 
Redundant Fixed Effects Test 
H0: Cross-sections are homogenous 
H1: Cross-sections are 
heterogeneous 
F=5.226  P-value= 
0.000897 
We reject H0 and conclude that 
the Fixed effects model should be 
used to account for country-
specific features.  
Random effects vs Fixed effects 
H0: µ1 = µ2 = … = µN-1 = 0 
HA: Not all equal to 0. 
Chi-
Square=33.337  
P-value=0.00 We reject H0. This means the 
fixed effects model is the best 
model that allows heterogeneity. 
Source: Author (Hausman test and F- test computed with E views 8) 
 
Regressions on the Impact of Financial Liberalization on ILR: Table 3 shows the results of regressions 
with the impact of financial liberalization on impaired loans ratio. The empirical results indicate that there is 
a positive relationship between financial instability and financial liberalization. A 1% increase in financial 
liberalization contributed 0.0745 percent increase in financial instability these results are in line with the 
apriori expectation and are also in line with the study of Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006). The authors argue 
that financial liberalisation results in an increase in financial resources. This does also result in funding of risk 
projects which may default in payment resulting in a financial crisis. The probability value for the test is less 
than 1% level of significance, indicating that the random effect panel data technique is not suitable for this 
study and a fixed effect was chosen. In Equation two, the financial reform dummy variable and domestic 
credit to the private sector were introduced.  
 
The introduced dummy variables captured the global financial crisis. Financial reform without the dummy 
variable was found to be positive and significant. When the financial reform interacted with the dummy, the 
relationship between financial instability and financial liberalization was positive though insignificant. This 
suggests that a 1% increase in financial reforms resulted in 0.238 percent increase in financial instability. 
This result again is consistent with Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006), Lorenzoni (2008), Magud, et al. (2012), 
Calderón and Kubota (2012), Bezemer, et al. (2015). The authors highlight that during the global financial 
crisis, financial liberalization resulted in an increase in competition by banks so as to maintain their 
profitability. This exposed the banks to risk entrepreneurs who defaulted in payment of their obligations and 
hence banks failures.   
 
Table 3: Regressions with the Impact of Financial Liberalization on ILR 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Variables FE FE FE 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS(-4) 
0.0745 
 (0.54) 
0.638 
 (0.0006) 
0.616 
(0.001) 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS(-4)*DT 
  
0.238 
(0.2291) 
0.262 
(0.195) 
LDCP   
-0.870* 
(0.001) 
-0.740* 
(0.001) 
LGOVERNMENT_EXP     
-0.915 
(0.035) 
LINFLATION     
-0.036** 
(0.889) 
GDP_GROWTH   
 
0.004 
(0.896) 
CONSTANT 
0.463 
(0.811) 
-6.994 
(0.0016) 
-4.601 
(0.037) 
        Years effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 1.65 1.65 1.65 
Adjusted R-squared 0.862 0.862 0.86 
Note: *** p < 0.01 level; ** p < 0.05 level; * p < 0.1 level  
Source: Author (Computed with E views 8) 
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On the other hand, the results show that for all the control variables, private credit, government expenditure 
and inflation they are all negatively related to financial instability. With regards to private credit which is the 
measure of financial development is negatively related to the financial crisis. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Abiad et al. (2010), Balmaceda, Fischer and Ramirez (2013) and Bezemer et al. (2015) who 
concluded that financial development increases financial openness which creates competitiveness, slowing 
down financial instability. It is essential to note that financial reform index including the Financial Reforms (-
4)*DT capturing the dummy which captures the global financial crisis in all the three equations has a positive 
relationship with impaired loans. This implies that banks in more financially liberalized selected SADC region 
countries prove to be financially unstable when there is a financial crisis. This is consistent with Bezemer 
(2015). In addition, the findings of Rancière, Tornell and Westerman (2006), are in line with these results.  
 
Regressions with Lagged Dependent Variable: In table 4 the dependent variable ILR is lagged. When the 
dependent variable has been lagged, the coefficients of ILR are significantly positive in all the three equations. 
This implies that there is partiality amongst the coefficients. The coefficient of ILR also increases. Bezemer, et 
al. (2015) indicates that a higher ILR ratio is an indication of financial instability. When the dependent 
variable is lagged, Equation one shows a negative relationship between financial reform index and financial 
instability and this relationship is also statistically insignificant. In Equation two and three the relationship 
changes to positive, but continues to be statically insignificant. On the other hand, financial reform index with 
a dummy variable has a positive relationship with financial instability and this relationship remains the same 
in all three equations. This is consistent with the study of Bezemer, et al. (2015). The authors highlight that 
liberalized economies are prone to the financial crisis which may also affect their growth prospects. Domestic 
credit to private is added into Equations two and three. In both the specifications, domestic credit to the 
public has a negative relationship with financial instability. The estimations show that an increase in credit in 
the private sector contributes to the decline of financial instability. These results are expected as according to 
Abaid, et al. (2010) who observed that more efficient credit allocation contributes to financial stability.  
 
Table 4: Regression with Lagged Dependent Variable (ILR) 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Variables FE FE FE  
IMPAIRED_LOANS(1) 
0.836 
(0.0003) 
0.696 
(0.01) 
0.424 
(0.211) 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS(-4) 
-0.056 
 (0.943) 
1.122 
(0.453) 
2.000 
(0.198) 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS(-4)*DT 
0.113  
(0.941) 
0.044 
(0.977) 
1.226  
 (0.467) 
LDCP 
 
  
-1.572 
(0.351) 
-2.888 
(0.132) 
GDP_GROWTH 
  
-0.199 
(0.498) 
LGOVERNMENT_EXP     
-4.859 
(0.187) 
LINFLATION     
-2.823 
(0.212) 
CONSTANT 
2.046 
(0.849) 
-10.975 
(0.533) 
-4.623 
(0.793) 
        
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30 30 30 
R-Square 0.67 0.69 0.75 
Note: *** p < 0.01 level; ** p < 0.05 level; * p < 0.1 level 
Source: Author (Computed with E views 8) 
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Residual Cross-Section Dependence Test: Diagnostic tests were conducted on the model. The results are 
presented in table 5.  
 
Table 5: Residual Cross-Section Dependence Test 
Test Test Statistic Critical 
value 
Conclusion 
Breusch-Pagan LM 
H0: There is no cross-section 
dependence in the residuals. 
H1: There is no cross-section 
dependence in the residuals. 
16.179 P-value= 
0.0100897 
We accept H0 and conclude that 
the model has no cross-section 
dependence in residuals. 
Pesaran scaled LM 
H0: There is no cross-section 
dependence in the residuals. 
H1: There is no cross-section 
dependence in the residuals. 
1.784  P-value=0.00 We accept H0 and conclude that 
the model has no cross-section 
dependence in residuals. 
Pesaran CD Test 
H0: There is no cross-section 
dependence in the residuals. 
H1: There is no cross-section 
dependence in the residuals. 
-0.0068 P-value=0.99 We reject H0 and conclude that 
the model has no cross-section 
dependence in residuals. 
 
The Residual Cross-Section Dependence Tests were run. In table 5 both LM test results showed a probability 
of 0.0128 and 0.0745, respectively. This indicates that, there is no correlation between the residual values in 
the model, and the null hypothesis is therefore accepted. The results of the Pesaran CD test show a probability 
of 0.99. This indicates that, there is a correlation between the residual values in the model and the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion  
 
The main objective of the study was to empirically examine the extent to which liberalization of the financial 
system can contribute toward financial instability in the selected SADC countries. Findings indicated that, 
financial liberalization may be another source of financial instability in the region. The results also 
established that there is a negative relationship between financial sector development and instability. This 
suggests that financial sector development plays a very important role in reducing financial instability over 
time, and not just instantly. This suggests that policymakers should focus on reforms that give due share to 
the regulations rather than just simply liberalizing the financial sector.  
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